Some Thoughts on Political Structure
as Constitutional Law
The Honorable John J. Gibbons *
Certainly I am going to endorse everything that Professor Levinson
has said about Professor Lynch’s wonderful book. It establishes beyond
question that there was no real consensus among the so-called founders
about what the Constitution meant and thus, Professor Levinson is
undoubtedly right that constitutional law should be taught as an ongoing
negotiation.
I will add one more reason why this must be the case. We talk about
constitutional law, but law divorced from sanction is not law at all. It is
perhaps scholarship, but unless constitutional law has a sanction it is
nothing more than rhetoric; the ability to sanction a judgment depends
completely on the will of the current political majority. The courts have no
power to enforce a judgment absent that will. And thus, the very question
of intentionalism in constitutional law seems to me to be a bit illogical.
During the five decades I have been a lawyer, original intent, or strict
construction, has been advanced—primarily by critics of the federal
judiciary—as the only sound constitutional doctrine. In particular, critics
of an allegedly activist Supreme Court have most frequently taken umbrage
at the Supreme Court’s recognition of certain individual autonomy interests
as constitutionally protected from regulation by the democratically elected
branches of federal or state government.
Perhaps the most influential of them has been Judge Robert H. Bork,
whose nomination to the Supreme Court in 1987 produced extended
hearings by the Senate Judiciary Committee on the appropriate interpretive
posture of judges faced with a constitutional law argument. With
considerable erudition, Bork passionately espoused the view that any
approach other then the search for original intention of the constitutional
draftsmen was illegitimate because it placed judges in the role of
lawmakers rather than neutral arbitrators.1
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Bork and others before him objected to interpretive approaches that
permit judges to look beyond original intent—principally on the ground
that judicial review, the authority of the court to declare enacted legislation
unconstitutional, is severely undemocratic. Marbury v. Madison,2 decided
in 1803, was criticized by Thomas Jefferson and members of his party
almost as soon as it was announced. Scholarly commentary about the
unique American contribution to political science—an independent
judiciary exercising the power of judicial review—has been the mainstay of
law reviews since their invention in the late nineteenth century.
Professor Lynch’s book, Negotiating the Constitution: The Earliest
Debates on Original Intent,3 looks at original intent from a different
perspective. As Professor Levinson observed, Lynch’s study covers the
period in the nation’s history prior to Marbury v. Madison and thus, prior to
the establishment of the Court’s role as the unique and final expositor of
the meaning of the written Constitution. His study begins with the
compromises made during the Philadelphia convention. 4 It explores the
arguments made during the state ratifying conventions.5 It ends with
Jefferson’s designation as President by the House of Representatives in
March of 1801. 6
Thus, it covers the uses made of constitutional argumentation by
members of the federal executive and the federal legislature during the
three terms of the Washington and Adams presidencies. In those twelve
years the role of the Article III courts in the formation of the new national
government was le ss significant than the role of the two political branches.
One interesting point about the pre-Marbury v. Madison period is the
relative paucity of legislative activity compared to later periods. Lynch
identifies six enactments that raised issues of constitutional interpretation:7
a law imposing on state officers a uniform oath of allegiance to the
Constitution; the law recognizing the President’s power to remove
incompetent department heads in the executive branch; the law establishing
a national bank; laws appropriating federal funds for the general welfare;
the Alien Act;8 and the Sedition Act.9 Each of these laws presented the
question whether, because their subject matter was not specifically
(1987) (statement of nominee Judge Robert H. Bork).
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enumerated in the list of federal legislative powers in Article I, Section 8,
they were beyond the political power of the national government.
With the exception of the Sedition Act, which restricted expression
and thus presented a First Amendment issue, none of the six enactments
presented what we would today identify as a human rights issue. Whether
or not the Necessary and Proper Clause10 authorized congressional
legislation on each of these other subjects, obviously some political
organization could legislate most of them without infringing the human
rights of individuals affected by the law. For example, states could, and
indeed did, prescribe oaths, charter banks, and appropriate funds for
general welfare. Which political body, state or federal, could regulate with
respect to immigration (the Alien Act) was a matter related quite closely to
the importation of slaves. But clearly, some political organization could
legislate to control the borders. These were all what we who write about
constitutional law refer to as federalistic questions. The dispute over the
presidential removal power was, in contrast, a separation of powers dispute
between branches of a single political organization, the federal government.
Thus, except for the Sedition Act, all of the disputes over legislative
authority in the first twelve years of the national government were over
matters of political power, not matters of individual liberty or autonomy.
What Professor Lynch’s study makes perfectly clear is that the
politicians in the executive branch and the federal legislature used the
rhetoric of strict construction when it suited their political purposes and
abandoned that rhetoric when it did not. James Madison, in particular,
advancing the interests of the Virginia planters who were his political
power base, said different things at different times about the limits of
federal government power and about the respective roles of the federal
executive and the federal le gislature.
Each of the six pieces of legislation that were enacted during the first
three presidential terms resulted from a give and take in the political
branches of the federal government. The federal courts were simply not
involved.
That, I suggest, is precisely how federalism issues and separation of
powers disputes should be resolved. They should be resolved by our
chosen representatives, in the executive and legislative branches of the
federal government, in place at that particular time. The great advantage of
recognizing the authority of the political branches to determine such
political issues is that their decisions are not final. Because of the
periodicity of representation in the Senate, the House of Representatives,
and the Presidency, those participants in the legislative process cannot bind
10
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their successors.
Thus, to use an example from the first Congress, the decision to create
a federally-chartered central bank was reconsidered when a later Congress
refused to re-charter it. That decision was in turn reconsidered in the
aftermath of the War of 1812 when Congress once again re-chartered a
federal central bank. The Jacksonian Democrats later put the second bank
of the United States to death in 1832, and federal central banking was not
restored until the Federal Reserve Bank was created in 1913. 11
Today, basking in the glow of an unprecedented period of strong
economic growth and limited inflation, most of us wonder how anyone
could doubt the constitutional authority of Congress to authorize regulation
of the nation’s money supply by a central bank. The legislative decision to
charter the first and second banks look not only constitutional, but much
wiser than the decisions that had put them out of business. Leaving the
control of the money supply in the hands of state-controlled institutions
was never a sound policy. However, at various times the representatives in
control of the federal legislative process thought that it was. They were
free to act on that insight or lack of insight until their successors thought
better of it.
That is why Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland12 is
so sound. Justice Marshall did not suggest that the nation must have a
central bank, although he probably thought it would be hard to prosper
without one. Rather, he recognized that the elected representatives of the
people could decide such a policy issue from time to time, and that once
those representatives had spoken, no state could frustrate their decision by
hostile legislation. 13
This same recognition of the periodicity of representation appears in
Marshall’s opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden.14 That opinion dealt not with the
power of the federal government, but with the power of the states to
regulate interstate commerce, despite the grant to Congress of an express
constitutional authority to do so. It was argued that the existence of this
express grant meant that there was no state power to regulate interstate
commerce.15 Justice Marshall was careful, however, to rest the holding on
the Licensing and Enrollment Act, a federal statute. Thus, the court was
11
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deferring to the political branch’s decision as to the ultimate reach of state
power.
Five years later in Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co.,16 what was
implicit in Gibbons v. Ogden became explicit. Where Congress had not
legislated, Delaware’s regulation of interstate commerce on a navigable
stream was valid. 17 In 1946, the Supreme Court in Prudential Insurance
Co. v. Benjamin 18 confirmed that the political branches of the federal
government have the final say on state power to regulate interstate
commerce.19 Nothing that the court has said since 1948 casts doubt on that
eminently sound proposition. The court, however, did take a wrong turn
with respect to the equal protection clause in Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co. v. Ward.20
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s recent approach with respect to
federal legislative power has not been as enlightened as that of the majority
position in the political branches during the first three presidential terms.
In National League of Cities v. Usery,21 a narrow majority held that
Congress lacked the power to require state munic ipal corporations to
comply with the Fair Labor Standards Act, which was garden-variety
federal economic legislation that had been routinely upheld for over four
decades.22 That radical departure from prior deference to decisions of the
political branches on federalism questions was short-lived. It was
overruled nine years later in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority.23
The return to reason in 1985, when Justice Blackmun changed his
position, proved not to be permanent either. An activist majority in United
States v. Lopez24 invalidated a federal statute prohibiting the possession of
firearms in a school zone on the ground that the statute invaded the
reserved powers of the states. The court refused to defer to the
determination of the political branches as to what was necessary and proper
to protect interstate commerce from firearms.
In Printz v. United States25 the court invalidated a federal statute
imposing on state officials the duty to register firearms, again relying on
the absence of federal authority to affect the reserved political powers of
16
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the states.
In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v.
College Savings Bank,26 the Court held that Congress lacked the power to
require the states to comply with the United States patent laws. This,
despite the fact that congressional authority to award patents is expressly
enumerated in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, and that patents are a federally
created property interest. According to the majority, neither the Commerce
Clause27 nor the Enforcement Clause28 of the Fourteenth Amendment
authorized that legislation. 29
Now, none of the cases I have just mentioned involves any human
rights issues. In each instance, some political power could, without unduly
invading individual autonomy, lay down a rule of decision. What the court
did in each case was take sides in what was, at most, a political dispute
among competing groups over the appropriateness of a given policy. That
taking of sides in a political dispute is illustrated graphically in National
League of Cities and in Garcia, where the issue was whether or not the
court would take away from labor unions the lobbying victory that they had
won in the Congress.
As Justice Blackmun observed in Garcia, the principal and basic limit
on the federal commerce power is that which is inherent in all
congressional actions;30 the built-in restraint that our system provides is
through state participation in federal governmental action. The political
process insures that laws that unduly burden the states will not be
promulgated. Furthermore, if they are, the people who voted for them will
be replaced in the next ele ction.
Thus, Justice Blackmun in Garcia heeded the wise counsel of
Professor Jessie H. Choper31 and others that the court should defer to the
political branches the constitutional issue of whether federal action is
beyond the authority of the central government and thus violates state’s
rights.
This is as true of Patent Clause legislation as of Commerce Clause
legislation. It is as true today as it was during the pre-Marbury v. Madison
era when Hamilton’s vision of the powers of the central government
prevailed.
In the final sentence of his marvelous book, Professor Lynch observes
26
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that it is Hamilton who deserves the title “Father of Constitutional Law.”32
The anti-Federalist activists on the Supreme Court today must have poor
Alexander Hamilton spinning in his grave.
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